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The Performance of Japanese Mutual Funds 
ABSTRACT 
We analyze the performance of Japanese open-type stock mutual funds for the 1981-1992 
period. The results show that, regardless of the performance measures and benchmarks 
employed, most of the Japanese mutual funds underperform the benchmarks by between 3.6% 
to 10.8% per annum. These funds tend to invest more in large stocks with low book-to-market 
ratios. But this feature does not explain the underperformance. A potential explanation is the 
dilution effect caused by inflows of funds. In Japan, a new investor of an open-type fund only 
pays in the after-tax value of the net asset value. We conduct a bootstrap experiment to assess 
the magnitude of this dilution effect. 
The overall performance of Japanese open-type stock mutual funds over the last fifteen 
years has not been impressive compared to that of the market. 1 The average rate of return of 
800 open-type mutual funds was 1.74% per annum between January 1981 and December 1992, 
while that of the market was 9.28% per annum during the same period. Regardless of the 
performance measures and benchmarks employed, we find strong evidence of 
underperformance in the Japanese mutual funds. 
It has been suggested that the meager performance of Japanese mutual funds may be due 
to institutional factors such as the contracts between fund managers and their employers as 
well as the relationships between mutual fund companies and brokerage houses. (See, for 
example, Economist (1994).) Major mutual fund companies are subsidiaries of the brokerage 
houses from which top management as well as many fund managers are drawn. The fund 
managers' salaries are paid from the fixed commissions that investors pay to the mutual fund 
companies. However, their salaries may not be directly linked to their investment performance. 
They are usually tied closely to the pay scale of the parent company which may be unrelated to 
each manager's performance. Good performance of a manager may result to a certain extent in 
quicker promotions or higher bonuses, but the link is not as explicit as in the United States. 
Such a compensation scheme may create an agency problem between the fund managers and 
the investors. According to the Economist (1994), the turnover ratio in Japanese mutual funds 
was more than twice the Tokyo market average during the 1980s. A high turnover ratio 
produces profits for the parent brokerage houses due to the fixed commissions for stock 
trading. Finally, major brokerage houses like Nomura, Nikko, Daiwa and Yamaichi 
recommend stocks for their clients. These recommendations may influence the selection of the 
stocks by the subsidiary mutual fund companies. The Japanese Ministry of Finance has been 
aware of the poor performance of the mutual funds and has come up with several ways to 
bring more competition into the business as well as to disclose more information to investors. 
First, the Ministry has permitted banks and foreign companies to manage mutual funds since 
1990. Second, the Ministry intends to promote comparisons of funds' performance so that 
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investors can make informed choices. At present, mutual fund managers are not allowed to 
compare their performance with rivals' in advertisements. Finally, since June 1994, fund 
managers have to disclose their commissions. 
We provide the first comprehensive study of Japanese mutual funds. Our sample covers 
the open-type stock mutual funds managed by nine investment management companies for 
the 1981-1992 period. We employ the traditional Jensen Measure [see Jensen (1968, 1969)] as 
well as the Positive Period Weighting Measure developed by Grinblatt and Titman (1989b, 
1993). Following Ferson and Schadt (1994), we incorporate conditional information directly 
into the performance measures to control for the biases arising from fund managers 
responding to public information. Further we investigate what kinds of strategy funds have 
followed in general. To this end we construct mimicking portfolios based on size and book-to-
market ratios, and explore if any of the performance found in the previous section can be 
explained by the weighting on these factors. 
In order to obtain valid inferences with various performance measures, the benchmark 
must be mean-variance efficient from the point of view of the uninformed investors. We 
employ two different benchmarks. The first one is a value-weighted single-index benchmark 
which covers stocks listed on both the first section and the second section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE), government bonds, corporate bonds and convertible bonds. The second 
benchmark consists of three factors: (1) the value-weighted market factor as described above; 
(2) a mimicking factor that is related to the size effect; and (3) another mimicking factor that is 
related to the book-to-market ratio. We find evidence that the three-factor benchmark is more 
appropriate than the single-index benchmark. However, our general conclusion is not affected 
by the choice of benchmark. 
We also evaluate the dilution effect on the net asset value of open-type funds. This effect is 
caused by a particular method according to which the sales price of a mutual fund share is 
calculated when there is an inflow of funds. Essentially, in the case of an outflow, the fund 
pays out net asset value (NAV) to the investors so that the NAV per share is unaffected by the 
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outflow. The investors pay capital gains tax, if any, from the proceeds. However, in the case of 
an inflow, new investors do not pay in the amount equal to the NAV per share. Instead, they 
pay in the after-tax value of NAV, which is the same amount as what existing investors would 
receive if they sold the share. Therefore the NAV per share is diluted by the inflow. This 
implies that the rate of return on the NAV is negative even if the return on the managed 
portfolio is zero. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives an introduction to Japanese mutual 
funds. Section 2 provides a comprehensive performance evaluation using various measures. 
This section also examines whether performance varies between different periods, whether any 
management company or companies performed better (or worse) than the others, and whether 
there is any persistence in performance among the managers. Section 3 analyzes how funds 
were managed and investigates their performance by using the mimicking portfolios based on 
size and book-to-market ratios This section also refers briefly to funds' timing ability. Section 
4 provides a simulation analysis of the dilution effect. Finally, the last section presents the 
conclusion. 
1. The Japanese Mutual Funds 
1.1 Overview of the mutual fund industry 
The Japanese mutual funds are of the contractual type, not of the corporate type which prevails 
in the US; thus the Japanese mutual funds are called investment trusts. A contract is made 
between an investment trust management company, a trustee (a trust bank), and a beneficiary 
(an investor). The cash collected from investors by management companies, through 
subscriptions or sales of beneficiary certificates, are transferred to the custody of a trustee 
company. The manager gives investment instructions to the trustee which administers and 
safe-keeps the assets.2 The administration fee of the trust bank is passed on to the investors as 
a debit subtracted from the net asset value of the mutual fund (or investment trust). In most 
3 
cases an investor of an open-type mutual fund is required to pay a fee up front as a fixed 
percentage of the value of the investment. 
At present in Japan, there are 16 domestic, 5 foreign-affiliated and 5 bank-affiliated 
investment trust management companies.3 However, a major portion of the investment trusts 
sold in Japan has been run by management companies that are subsidiaries of Japanese 
brokerage houses. Many of these management companies originate from the investment trust 
division of the brokerage houses, which originally managed their own investments. The 
management company delegates subscriptions and sales of the investment trusts to brokerage 
houses; at present, the majority of funds are sold through brokerage houses that are parents of 
the fund management firms. A small portion of funds managed by foreign- or bank-affiliated 
companies is sold by brokerage houses that are not affiliated with the management companies, 
or are sold directly by the management firms. The sample we use includes only those funds 
that are sold by the parent brokerage houses because most of the other types of funds did not 
start operation before 1990. 
Depending on the portfolio structure, investment trusts in Japan can be classified into two 
kinds: stock investment trusts and bond investment trusts. The latter invest only in bonds and 
money market instruments. The former, however, invest not only in stocks but also in bonds 
(including convertible bonds and warrants) and the money market. According to the 
investment policy of the funds, stock investment trusts are broadly classified into three 
categories: growth type, stable growth type, and stable type. The growth type typically has no 
upper limit on the proportion that the fund can invest in stocks, whereas the stable growth 
type does have such limits. The stable type mainly invests in convertible bonds.4 At the end of 
1992, the portfolio weights of stocks, bonds and other money market instruments in stock 
investment trusts were 50.2%, 17.6%, and 26.5%, respectively. (See Investment Trusts 
Association (1994).) The investment trusts in Japan can be grouped into the open-type and the 
unit type. The former allows additional flow of funds into the trust property after the fund's 
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institution, while the latter does not. We focus on the open-type investment trusts because 
unit-type funds operate only for about five years. 
The investment trusts in Japan represented about 3.5 percent of financial assets of the 
household sector as of the end of 1992.5 This figure includes both stock and bond investment 
trusts as well as both open-type and unit-type investment trusts. At the end of the same year, 
investment trusts had approximately 43 trillion yen in aggregate assets, of which 21 trillion was 
in stock investment trusts. The following numbers summarize the stockholdings of the funds 
during 1992. The total market value of stocks held by the funds was 10.1 trillion yen or 12.5 
million shares, which amounts to 3.4% and 3.6%, respectively, of total stocks outstanding on all 
stock exchanges in Japan at the end of the year. The stocks traded by the funds during the 
year, the sum of buys and sells, amounted to 12.2 trillion yen or 13.9 million shares, which 
represented 15.1% in value and 16.8% in volume of the aggregate stock trading. Therefore, the 
turnover ratio of all funds was 110.7% while that of the market was 47.68% during the year. 
1.2 Management fees and taxes 
There are two sources of costs that are borne by investors (or beneficiaries) of the investment 
trust. The net asset value (NAV) of a fund is determined after deducting these costs from the 
asset value. The first cost component is a fixed management fee paid to the management 
company, the trust bank and the brokerage house that subscribes and sells the investment trust 
security. The amount of the fee ranges from 0.55% to 1.5% of the total asset value and the fee is 
deducted from the total value on a daily basis. The second component is the securities transfer 
tax plus the brokerage commission which is paid to the brokerage house that executes orders 
from the management company. This part of the management fee varies according to the 
amount of turnover. The brokerage commission rates vary from 1.150% of transactions valued 
under 1 million yen to 0.100% of those above 500 million and below 1 billion yen. For 
transactions over 1 billion yen, the commission rates are negotiable. (These rates were 
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amended on June 4, 1990.) The securities transfer tax on equity is 0.3%(since April 1992) of the 
market price, and is paid by investors when they sell shares. 
To provide an estimate of the transaction costs, we need estimates of both turnover rate 
and average transaction value. From the aggregate data, the annual turnover rate was 
approximately 110% for 1992. Since we do not have data on the average transaction value, we 
arbitrarily choose a range of commission rates that is plausible for institutional investors: from 
0.375% for transactions valued from 30 million to 50 million yen for the lower range, to 0.100% 
for those from 500 million to 1 billion yen for the higher range. Assuming a turnover rate of 
110%, the variable portion of transaction cost ranges from approximately 0.72% to 1.32% per 
annum. These figures assume securities transfer tax rate of 0.45%, a rate that had been 
imposed during most of our observation period.6 If the fixed management fee is 0.55% (1.5%), 
the total transaction cost ranges from 1.27% (2.22%) to 1.87% (2.82%). 
1.3 Mutual fund data 
The mutual fund data are obtained from Kinyuu Deta Sisutemu (Financial Data Systems 
Incorporated) in Tokyo for the period from January 1978 to April 1994. The dataset includes 
1,151 open-type mutual funds managed by 26 management companies. Every fund that 
existed during the period is included; thus there is no survivorship bias. Among the 26 
companies, half of them started operation only after 1990. In particular, we chose nine 
management companies that operated throughout the observation period. These companies 
include: Nomura, Nikko, Yamaichi, Daiwa, Taiyo, Shin-Wako, Sanyo, Asahi, and Japan. For 
individual fund analysis, we select the funds with more than 97 observations from January 
1981 to December 1992.7 We find 64 funds managed by the nine fund management companies 
After adjusting the NAV for splits, if any, we calculated the continuously compounded 
monthly returns with dividend payments for all the funds.8 To assess the aggregate 
performance of the Japanese mutual funds, we construct two portfolios, vw800 and ew800, 
which are the value- and equal-weighted portfolios, respectively, of all the 800 mutual funds 
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run by the nine fund management companies. We also construct both value- and equal-
weighted portfolios of the 64 individual funds, vw64 and ew64. Since some of these funds 
concentrate investment in certain industries, foreign equities, or convertible bonds, we 
construct additional portfolios of funds that primarily invest in well-diversified Japanese 
equities. We find 190 diversified equity funds among the universe of 800 funds, and 13 among 
the 64 funds with relatively long history.9 
1.4 Basic performance 
Table 1 shows that the average raw returns of the open-type mutual funds during the entire 
observation period (Jan. 1981 - Dec. 1992) were 1.73% and 2.41% per annum for vw800 and 
ew800, respectively. The well-diversified Japanese equity funds (i.e., the 190 and 13 portfolios) 
show lower mean returns and higher standard deviations than those of the 800 and 64 
portfolios. The sub-period figures show that the well-diversified equity funds did particularly 
poorly in the bear market during the Jan. 1990 - Dec. 1992 period. Comparing the mutual fund 
returns to various benchmarks, we find that the average performance of Japanese mutual funds 
underperformed various measures, even after adding back a transaction cost of, say, 5%. 
The first benchmark in the table, the value-weighted index that performed 8.91% during 
the full observation period, includes all stocks listed on the TSE, all government and corporate 
bonds with a longer than one-year maturity, and convertible bonds.10 Since Japanese stock-
type mutual funds invest not only in stocks but also in bonds and convertible bonds, it is 
appropriate to compare fund performance with this benchmark. The buy-and-hold 30 portfolio 
includes the 30 largest stocks as of the end of 1980. Its return was the highest (14.85% for the 
whole observation period) though its standard deviation was also the largest. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for individual funds as well as for the nine 
management firms. Note that the returns in Table 2 are reported in terms of monthly returns 
instead of annual returns. For each company, mean return and standard deviation are 
reported for equally weighted portfolios of all its funds and for its well-diversified Japanese 
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equity funds. With the exception of three management firms (Nomura, Sanyo and Asahi), 
well-diversified equity funds performed worse than the average of all funds. Among the 64 
individual funds, performance varies from -0.74% per month (-8.87% p.a.) to 0.94% per month 
(11.29% p.a.), and standard deviation from 1.99% per month (6.89% p.a.) to 8.82% per month 
(30.54% p.a.). Among the 13 well-diversified equity funds, the mean varies from -0.25% per 
month (-2.98% p.a.) to 0.94% per month (11.29% p.a.), and standard deviation from 3.85% per 
month (13.33% p.a.) to 5.93% per month (20.54% p.a.) Although the observation periods for the 
funds are not exactly the same, they overlap during the majority of the period. (Figure 1 shows 
a plot of mean return against standard deviation of individual funds.) 
2. The Performance 
2.1 Performance measures 
lensen Measure 
Suppose the monthly return of the mutual fund,;', in excess of the one-month risk-free 
rate, anc is the excess return on the mean-variance efficient market portfolio; then the 
Jensen Measure refers to the intercept ocv in the following regression: 
A positive Jensen Measure indicates superior performance if the mutual fund manager 
possesses stock selection ability but no timing ability. 
Positive Period Weighting (PPW) Measure 
When the fund manager also has timing ability, ay can be negative even if the manager 
was successful both in selecting stocks and gauging market timing. Conversely ay can be 
positive even if the manager was not successful in both stock selection and timing; see Jensen 
(1972), Admati and Ross (1985), Dybvig and Ross (1985) and Lehmann and Modest (1987). We 
therefore calculate the PPW measure developed by Grinblatt and Titman (1989b, 1993) to 
address the problem of a negative Jensen Measure when a manager has timing information. 
The PPW measure for fund / is defined as a summation: is the excess 
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return of the fund for period t, and the summation is over the observation period of the data. 
The weights are chosen to be non-negative and satisfy the following relation for the excess 
return of a benchmark, for the same p e r i o d : T h i s relation corresponds to 
the first-order condition for holding the optimal benchmark portfolio where the weights 
correspond to the marginal utility of an investor. To derive these weights, we assume a risk-
averse investor with a power utility function who maximizes his expected utility (or the 
average utility over the sample period), The marginal utility at time t 
where the gross return represents the wealth level in each period, 
assuming the initial wealth is 1. The risk-free rate at time t is denoted by rt^ , and y is the 
optimal weight of the benchmark portfolio obtained by maximizing the expected (or the 
average) utility. The time series of the marginal utilities are rescaled so that they add up to 1; 
We choose the risk aversion parameter, 6, of -
0.68 because the optimal portfolio under this parameter setting requires no holdings of the risk-
free asset. We calculate each set of weights for different benchmarks as well as for different 
observation periods. 
Conditional lensen Measure 
Ferson and Schadt (1994) recognize the importance of incorporating changing economic 
conditions in evaluating mutual fund performance. If fund managers shift their portfolios 
based on public information on the economic conditions, traditional (unconditional) 
performance measures that do not take into account of this effect can be biased. By 
conditioning on time-varying economic variables, Ferson and Schadt (1994) obtain results that 
are different from the unconditional analysis. In the conditioned model the beta of a managed 
portfolio is assumed to be a linear function of public information vector Zj- that captures 
changing economic conditions: 
where by is the unconditional mean of the conditional beta The second coefficient, 
&2/ is a beta response coefficient vector that tracks how the beta varies with the innovation of 
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the conditioning variable vector Zf=Z^-E(Zf). By multiplying the market return to /WZj), the 
following regression is obtained: 
Since returns are expressed in terms of excess returns from the risk-free rate, the additional 
factor in (2) can be interpreted as a self-financing dynamic strategy that purchases Zj- units of 
market portfolio by borrowing on the risk-free market. 
2.2 Benchmark and conditioning variables 
Since Japanese stock mutual funds invest not only in stocks but also in bonds as well as 
convertible bonds, we use the value-weighted benchmark that consists of these assets. The 
conditioning variables are: dividend yield of the value-weighted index, the one-month Gensaki 
rate, the term spread between the yield on the ten-year government bond and the one-month 
Gensaki rate, and finally the January dummy variable. Dividend yield for the market is 
constructed from the difference between the two market index returns with and without 
dividends provided by the PACAP Japanese database. The dividend yield used is computed 
by summing the monthly dividends for the 12 months preceding month t and dividing the 
sum with the index without dividends for month t. The one-month Gensaki rates and the 
yields on the 10-year government bond are from the Daiwa Institute of Research. 
2.3 Performances 
Table 3 summarizes the results of estimating the Jensen Measure based on both unconditional 
and conditional benchmarks. The results confirm that Japanese open-type mutual funds 
significantly underperform the market index. The second and third columns of Panel A show 
unconditional and conditional Jensen alphas for the aggregate portfolios. The portfolio alphas 
of funds in the "All Category" are consistently negative and are statistically significant with 
numbers ranging from -0.501% to -0.587% per month (around -6% to -8% p.a.). The well-
diversified equity funds did worse, by -8% to -9.5% p.a. below the benchmark. Even allowing 
10 
for transaction cost as high as 5%, the funds still on average underperform the index. The 
second panel shows summary results for individual funds. Almost all funds have negative 
alphas, with a majority being statistically significant. In particular, all 13 well-diversified 
equity funds have negative alphas and 11 of them are statistically significant. We examine the 
alphas of foreign-investment funds to see if they had particularly poor performance due to the 
appreciation of the yen exchange rate during the observation period. The average alpha of the 
six foreign-investment funds is -0.425 while that of the domestic-only funds is -0.568. Thus in 
our sample, whether or not to include foreign-investment funds does not seem to affect the 
general result.11 
In the conditional models, the Jensen Measures do not get better. Figure 2 plots the 
histogram for the unconditional and conditional Jensen Measures. Both the unconditional and 
conditional Jensen Measures are skewed to the left. The results contrast with those of Ferson 
and Schadt (1994) who find that in the US data, the alphas become more positive when using 
the conditional model. They show that when the covariance between the conditional beta and 
the excess return on the market portfolio, cov(rm, £>2iz)' *s negative, the unconditional Jensen 
Measure is negatively biased.12 They find this to be the case for the US funds, which explains 
why they can reverse the negative measure found for the unconditional model. We do not, 
however, find significant negative correlation between the conditional betas and the excess 
market return, which explains why our conditional alphas do not get better than the 
unconditional ones. 
The conditional variables, however, have information. For example, the third column 
Panel A reports the p-value of the F-test for the significance of the information variables for the 
aggregate portfolios.13 The results show that additional conditional variables are significant for 
explaining the return dynamics of the mutual funds. Panel A also reports the R2 from the two 
regressions. The conditional variables provide additional explanatory power of 3% to 4%. 
The PPW measures are also negative and similar to the Jensen Measures in size for the 
aggregate portfolios. With regard to the individual funds, 61 out of the 64 estimates are 
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negative from the unconditional model, with 40 being significant at the 10% level and 28 being 
significant at the 5% level. Most of the funds' PPW measures are between -0.3% to -0.9% per 
month, or -3.6% to -10.8% per annum. The results for the well-diversified equity funds are also 
similar to those of both conditional and unconditional alphas. 
Finally, we note that the survivorship bias should not be a major concern for the 64 funds 
selected for individual analysis. Others have noted that the reliance on surviving funds 
positively skew the performance measure (Grinblatt and Titman (1989a), Brown, Goetzmann, 
Ibbotson and Ross (1992)). In our case, however, the 64 funds with relatively long history 
show worse performance than the overall industry funds (the 800 portfolios) using any 
measures presented in this section. Therefore survivorship bias may not to be a major issue. 
2.4 Betas 
In the first column of Table 4 Panel A the beta coefficients from the unconditional model range 
from 0.835 to 0.958 for the 800 and 64 "All Category" portfolios, and from 1.020 to 1.156 for the 
190 and 13 "Well-diversified equity" portfolios. The average beta coefficients of the conditional 
model, bi, are shown in the second column of the table. Conditional betas are larger than the 
unconditional ones. This implies that the unconditional betas may be biased and that 
managers could be adjusting their portfolios to changing economic conditions. Particularly, the 
well-diversified equity funds tend to have betas larger than unity and are larger than the 
average of all funds. However, the mutual fund industry as a whole, represented by the 800 
portfolios, has a risk position that is close to that of the market. 
Before we look at the sensitivities of the betas to individual conditional variables, we 
consider whether the same set of information variables can forecast the market returns. We 
regress the excess returns of the market portfolio one month ahead on the information 
variables of the current month. All information variables are expressed as innovations from 
the long-term mean. The regression result shows that the dividend yield (divt) is positively 
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related, and the one-month Gensaki rate (rgt) and term spread (spf) are negatively related to the 
excess return on the market portfolio: 
This implies that these conditioning variables have predictive power for the market returns one 
period ahead. The negative relation between the spread and market index return from the TSE 
is also found in Campbell and Hamao (1992). If managers use this information in adjusting 
their portfolios, the portfolio betas should respond positively to a change in the dividend yield, 
and negatively to a change in the Gensaki rate and the term spread. 
The last four columns show the sensitivities of betas to these conditioning variables and 
the January dummy. Fund managers do respond positively to dividend yield. With regard to 
the interest rate information, the beta responses are mostly positive, opposite to the prediction 
that managers use the interest rate information in forecasting the market returns. For 
individual funds, we observe that the sign for the dividend yield is positive for most of the 
funds (positive for all well-diversified equity funds), of which about half of them are 
statistically significant. However, the signs for the short-term interest rate and the term short 
spread are positive for most of the funds, of which about one-half and one-third are significant, 
respectively. 
The results from both the aggregate and individual funds suggest that Japanese mutual 
fund managers responded correctly to the information in the dividend yield but incorrectly to 
the interest rate information. Finally, the signs of the coefficients of January dummies are all 
negative but not all of the coefficients are statistically significant. Particularly, the coefficients 
for well-diversified equity funds tend to be less significant. 
2.5 Sub-period and company analysis 
Our observation period, which is from Jan. 1981 to Dec. 1992, covers a long bull market until 
the end of 1989 and the subsequent bear market. We estimate the performance measures for 
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the two sub-periods to determine if they differ between the two market environments. The 
results of Table 5 show that the performance has not been any better for both sub-periods. 
We next check whether the aggregate performance is affected by a few poor performing 
companies. Table 6 show both conditional and unconditional alphas for the nine management 
companies for the entire observation period as well as for the two sub-periods. The table 
covers only the well-diversified equity funds since the composition of other types of funds may 
differ among companies. Also, we employ equal-weighted portfolios, instead of value-
weighted ones, to avoid bias that may arise if large funds perform differently from others. The 
result shows that even the best performing company (company A in the table) seems to 
underperform the index significantly by 5.8 to 5.9% p.a. 
Furthermore, we examine if there is persistence in the performance of nine management 
companies. Table 6 includes the ranking of the companies from 1 to 9. We split the periods 
according to the previous analysis and estimate the Jensen Measures for both unconditional 
and conditional models. We calculate the Spearman rank correlation between the two periods. 
The rank correlation of company alphas for the unconditional model is -0.10, and for the 
conditional model is 0.00. We conclude that there is little persistence in performance among 
the companies. 
3. An Investigation of Managers' Strategies 
3.1 Passive strategies 
For comparison with the sample of mutual funds, we construct a number of portfolios based on 
passive strategies that use only known accounting information and no private information 
about the stocks. The purpose of this exercise is to validate our approach; since these passive 
portfolios are formed without private information, they should not show evidence of stock 
selection ability in the empirical models considered by us. 
Fama and French (1992) show that two empirically determined variables, size and book-to-
market ratio, effectively explain the cross-section of average returns on the US stocks for the 
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1963-1990 period, among other variables like market beta, E/P and leverage. Chan, Hamao and 
Lakonishok (1991) examine cross-sectional regressions for the Japanese stock market and reach 
similar conclusions. Also in a time series context, Fama and French (1993) demonstrate that 
the market factor and the mimicking factors related to size and book-to-market ratio effects 
successfully capture the common variations in the stock market. Motivated by these results, 
we construct 36 value-weighted passive portfolios from all stocks listed on the TSE. These 
include 25 portfolios formed by a two-way sort on size and book-to-market ratios (BE/ME), six 
portfolios formed on the earnings price ratio (E/P) and the five portfolios formed on the ratio 
between book asset and market equity (BA/ME). The first of the six E/P portfolios consists of 
stocks with negative earnings. The rest of the stocks are broken into five groups, from lowest 
to highest E /P ratios. Since these 36 portfolios do not use private information, they should 
generate zero intercept when regressed on benchmarks and therefore can provide a basis for 
comparison with the mutual fund performance. We rebalance the portfolios once a year based 
on the most currently available information. Most of the Japanese companies have March as 
the end of their fiscal year, and the annual reports published by the Ministry of Finance become 
available to the public a few months later. Therefore we construct the portfolio in July when 
most of the new information first becomes available to the public. When calculating the 
BE/ME, BA/ME and E /P ratios in July, we use the market values at the end of June, and the 
accounting values from the previous fiscal year that ends anytime between April of the 
previous year to March of the current year. 
We regress excess returns of the 36 passive portfolios on the excess returns of the market 
portfolio. The first panel of Table 7 reports the intercepts from the unconditional model. Most 
of the significant positive intercepts are from the portfolios of smaller size and higher book-to-
market ratios, and a significantly negative alpha is observed for portfolio with the largest size 
and lowest BE/ME ratio. This evidence implies the inefficiency of the value-weighted market 
portfolio; i.e., one can buy small stocks with high book-to-market ratios to beat the 
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performance of the value-weighted portfolio. The second panel of Table 7 summarizes the 
results for the conditional model which is similar to those from the unconditional regression.14 
3.2 Three-factor model 
Based on the findings above, we investigate if underperformance of the Japanese open-type 
mutual funds stems from investing in large and low BE/ME stocks. To this end we construct 
factors that represent the two factors described above. First, we construct passive portfolios 
based on size and book-to-market ratios in a similar manner explained in the previous section. 
For size-based groups, we use the median to split the stocks into the big and small groups (S 
and B). For the BE/ME ratios, we group the stocks based on breakpoints for the bottom 30% 
(low), the middle 40% (medium) and the top 30% (high) ratios. Therefore we have six 
portfolios; i.e., small and large firm portfolios each classified into low, medium and high book-
to-market ratios. We use the notation SL, SM and SH for small firm portfolios with three 
different levels of book-to-market ratios, and BL, BM and BH for the three large firm portfolios. 
After forming the portfolios, we calculate monthly value-weighted returns by using the same 
weights from July of the current year to June of the following year. Next we calculate returns 
of two self-financing portfolios; one related to size and the other to the book-to-market ratio. 
The mimicking portfolio that is related to size, SMB, is the difference between the average 
returns of the three small-stock portfolios (SL, SM, SH) and the average of the three large-stock 
portfolios (BL, BM, BH). The return on the mimicking portfolio should be free of the influence 
of the BE/ME effect and should characterize the return difference between large and small 
stocks. Similarly, the return of the mimicking portfolio that is related to the book-to-market 
ratio, HML, is the difference between the average return of two high BE/ME portfolios (SH and 
BH) and that of the two low BE/ME portfolios (SL and BL). The returns of the HML portfolio 
should be free of the influence of size and should capture the difference in returns of the high 
and low BE/ME stocks. The correlation between the two factors, SMB and HML, is small 
(-0.04). 
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In the next step we regress the excess returns of various passive portfolios that we 
constructed in Section 3.1 on the three factors. Most of these passive portfolios do not generate 
abnormal performance with respect to the three-factor benchmark (not reported). This result 
implies that the three factors can mimic an efficient benchmark. Similar results have been 
found by Fama and French (1992) for the US stock market. The explanatory power of the three 
factors against the passive 25 size and book-to-market sorted portfolio returns are 0.811 on 
average. The adjusted R-squares is relatively low compared to those results found by Fama 
and French (1993). The reason is that our market index, or the first factor, includes bonds. 
When we use the stock index (TOPIX) for the first factor, the average R-square increases to 
0.912, which is comparable to Fama-French results. Therefore the size and book-to-market 
factors are reasonable factors for explaining the equity portion of the mutual funds returns. 
Our primary interest is to find whether the underperformance that has been shown in the 
previous section is due to the inefficiency of the single-factor benchmark; i.e., whether using a 
more efficient benchmark mitigates the possible bias in the estimate of the Jensen Measure. 
The unconditional three-factor model refers to the following equation: 
where are the unconditional betas for the market factor, the size factor and 
the book-to-market ratio, respectively. Alternately, the conditional three-factor model refers to 
the following equation: 
where b\, b-^ SMB
 a n c j ^ H M L a r e a v e rage conditional beta, and b^, b ^ ^ and i^HML are 
vectors of beta responsive coefficients with respect to the factors. The vector of information 
variables, Zf, includes dividend yield, the one-month Gensaki rate, the term spread and the 
January dummy. The Jensen Measures are intercepts of the equations. In Table 8 the second 
and the seventh columns still indicate underperformance where the magnitude of Jensen 
Measures are close to the estimates from the single-factor models. Panel B of Table 8 and 
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Figure 3 show the Jensen Measures of individual funds. Although the results are similar 
between the two models, the conditional model show slightly more significant negative alphas 
than the unconditional model.15 In sum, the inclusion of size and book-to-market factors do 
not affect the underperformance of the funds. 
Although the underperformance is not explained, the coefficients on the factors provide 
interesting information about how managers formed their portfolios. The mimicking factor 
SMB measures the difference in returns between the large and small stock. A positive 
(negative) coefficient on the SMB factor indicates that the underlying fund is tilted toward 
smaller (larger) stocks relative to the market index. From Panel A of Table 8, the SMB slopes 
for the eight mutual fund portfolios are all negative and the t-statistics exceed 2, except for the 
ew800, vwl90 and ewl90 for the unconditional model. For the conditional model, the 
coefficients are all significant. For the individual funds we find that about one third of the 
estimates is significantly negative among the 64 funds, and most of them both negative and 
significant for the 13 well-diversified equity funds. 
The mimicking factor HML measures the difference in returns between the high and low 
BE/ME ratio stocks. Again, a negative coefficient on the HML factor indicates that the 
underlying fund is tilted toward low BE/ME ratio stocks relative to the market index. The 
slopes of the HML factor are all negative for the aggregate portfolios. Although the coefficients 
are not significant for the 800 portfolios with the unconditional model, they are all significant 
with the conditional model. For the 64 individual funds, half of them have negative slopes, 
most of which are not significant for the unconditional model. However, for the conditional 
model, most of them are negative and half of them are significant. In particular, for the 13 well-
diversified equity funds, all of them have negative signs and most of them are statistically 
significant. 
We can conclude that for most of the Japanese mutual funds, the average conditional betas 
for the SML factor and the HML factor are negative. In other words, the Japanese mutual fund 
managers tilt towards stocks with large market capitalization and low BE /ME ratios, or large 
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and glamour stocks. However, our results show such strategies are not the source of 
underperformance.16 In a recent paper, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) show that 
investment strategies that buy out-of-favor or value stocks (i.e., those with high book-to-market 
ratio for example) have outperformed glamour strategies over the 1968-1989 period in the US. 
They conjecture that the results can be best explained by the preference of both institutional 
and individual investors for glamour stocks and by their avoidance of value stocks. 
Particularly institutions might prefer glamour stocks because they appear to be prudent to 
investors. The results for the Japanese mutual funds are consistent with this conjecture. In 
addition to this, managers of open-type mutual funds may tend to hold more liquid glamour 
stocks rather than invest in small and less liquid ones since the funds are exposed to 
repurchases from the investors.17 
3.3 Timing and selectivity 
Timing refers to manager's ability to tilt his portfolio to a greater portion of the market portfolio 
when market return is higher and vice versa. Treynor and Mazuy (1966) captures such 
nonlinear relation by a squared term of the return on the market portfolio. Ferson and Schadt 
(1994) extend the analysis to a conditional setting. Our results (not reported) show negative 
timing coefficients that are statistically significant for the single index models, both 
unconditional and conditional. As a result, Jensen's alphas shift in a positive direction, for 
examples, by 0.175% per month (2.1% p.a.) for the vw800 portfolio, and 0.207% (2.5% p.a.) for 
the ew800 portfolio, relatively to the alphas of the model without the timing coefficient. 
Therefore it seems as if part of negative alphas are explained by negative timings. 
To assess the validity of the model, we apply the model to the 36 passive portfolios. We 
find that most of the timing coefficients are negative; particularly portfolios with large and low 
book-to-market stocks tend to have significant coefficients while the others do not. The alphas 
of these passive portfolios becomes uniformly higher, say by 0.2% to 0.3% per month, 
compared to those of the models without the timing coefficient. Therefore we cannot conclude 
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that the mutual funds' significant timing coefficients and less negative alphas are due to 
negative timing. Instead, this result may be due to the fact that funds hold large and low book-
to-market stocks. Similar results holds for the conditional model as well.18 As pointed out by 
Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer, and Ross (1986), it is difficult to separate timing from 
selective activities. Further, it is possible to construct portfolios that show artificial timing 
ability when no true timing exists. In practice, investing in options will generate spurious 
timing, and in less-option-like securities negative timing. For example, a portfolio of lower 
leveraged firms, which is less option-like in nature, may show negative timing; see Korajczyk 
and Jagannathan (1986) and Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) for a detailed discussion. 
4. The Dilution Effect of Fund Inflows 
To explain the dilution effect, we first show how capital gain tax is determined for open-type 
mutual funds.19 When an investor sells an existing share of funds, the after-tax price (P) is net 
asset value (NAV) minus capital gain tax; P=NAV-Tax. (Note that the mutual fund returns that 
we used are calculated from NAV.) In the case of open-type mutual funds, the capital gain of a 
fund is defined by the government as the difference between the current NAV and the historical 
average of the after-tax price (P) since the start of the fund; i.e., the capital gain is Max[NAV - P, 
0] where P is the average price since the fund's inception, or the average of past Ps.20 The 
government is able to collect taxes without keeping track of individual transactions of investors 
as long as the capital gain is defined in this manner. Thus, the capital gain of an open-type 
mutual fund can be calculated for each fund at each point in time, not for each investor 
transactions. 
The NAV per share may be diluted when a new investor buys shares of an existing fund. 
Dilution occurs when the price investor pays for a share is less than the existing NAV per 
share. This is the case for open-type funds because a new investor is only required to pay the 
after-tax NAV (i.e., P), not NAV. Only when there is no capital gain is the after-tax price equal 
to the NAV per share. Thus when there is capital gain, fund inflow causes the dilution. In the 
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case of an outflow, the fund pays out NAV to an investor so that the NAV per share remains 
the same after the transaction. 
The dilution effect can be formulated as follows: Let n be the number of existing mutual 
fund shares, a the number of newly issued shares, and d the number of repurchased shares by 
the fund. The value of NAV after the transactions is denoted by a prime, and the after-tax 
value by P as defined above. When an investor withdraws money out of the fund, the fund 
pays out the NAV and the investor pays the capital gain tax, if any, from the proceeds, while 
the new investors pay in only P. Therefore we have: NAV'=(nNAV+aP-dNAV)/(n+a-d) = NAV-
aTax where a = a/(n+a-d). If the return on the managed portfolio is r during the period, then 
we have: NAV'= NAV(l+r) - aTax where the last term shows the dilution effect. The capital 
gain tax is calculated using the following formula: Tax - (0.2)Max[NAV(2+r) - P, 0] where the 
tax rate is 20%. A single period expected return of the NAV, E(NAV')/NAV-1, is 
where E is the expectation operator. Given the expected performance of the managed portfolio, 
E(r), the expected dilution effect is larger if (1) the rate of future inflow of funds (a) is larger 
and (2) current P /NAV is lower. The dilution effect is not an effect that lasts for only a single 
period, but extends into subsequent periods. In the above example above, the current 
transaction price of the investor, P, is equal to NAV-(0.2)Tax. In a transaction, inflow or 
outflow, in the following period, this price is incorporated in the average transaction price, P. 
The ratio between this new average transaction price and the NAV in the next period is used to 
determine the capital gain in the next transaction. Due to this multi-period effect, the dilution 
effect is larger if (3) the fund is older. The third effect is true since the movement of P becomes 
more smooth and less responsive to the current movement of the NAV as the fund becomes 
older. Therefore there is higher probability that future NAV is larger than future P, thus 
higher probability of dilution. 
Since information on a and P for individual funds are not available, we conduct a 
bootstrap experiment using the actual distribution of the single factor benchmark index. 
21 
Although the fund inflow rate is a stochastic variable, we treat it as a non-stochastic parameter 
in the simulation. We provide results for different inflow rates. We assume that a fund 
manager invests in an index portfolio which is equal to the single factor benchmark that we 
used in the previous sections. Thus the portfolio returns are drawn from the distribution of the 
benchmark returns from January 1981 to December 1992. The experiment is repeated one 
thousand times each, using various sets of parameters. Table 9 Panel A shows the mean and 
standard deviation of the dilution effect from one thousand replications for various sets of 
parameters. The numbers are in terms of percentages per month. From the same set of 
experiments, Panel B reports the probability that the dilution effect explains the 
underperformance of -0.6% per month which is a ballpark figure of the underperformance of 
the aggregate mutual fund portfolios. We have no information about the initial difference 
between NAV and P at the starting point of the simulation (i.e., January 1981). Therefore we 
present three cases where NAV is higher than P by 10%, is at the same level as P, and is 
lower than P by 10%. We know that the average aggregate inflow rate during the observation 
period is around 0.1 (10%) per month21. However, the aggregate inflow includes new mutual 
funds that started during the observation period. It is the inflow to an existing fund that is 
relevant to the dilution effect. Thus the inflow that causes dilution should be smaller than that 
implied by the aggregate inflow rate. Therefore we also provide results that assume smaller 
inflow rates. The age of the fund at the beginning of the simulation is set equal to 10 years. 
For example, among the 64 funds, 28 funds existed in January 1981, and the average age was 
13.3 years. The effective age of the index of both 64 and 800 funds should be much younger 
because many of the funds started operation after 1983. Panel A shows that, with the inflow 
rate of 0.1, the average dilution effect is between .336% and .424% per month. Panel B shows 
that, at this inflow rate, the dilution effect explains the underperformance with probability zero. 
But it can explain half of the underperformance (-3%) with probability of more than fifty 
percent. At a smaller, but perhaps more reasonable, inflow rate of 0.05 per month, the average 
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dilution effect drops to between .211% and .271% per month, and the probability that it can 
explain even half the underperformance drops to less than 30%. 
However we must be very careful in interpreting these figures because they are based on 
hypothetical simulations whose assumptions may differ from the situations of individual 
funds.22 One piece of information suggests that the dilution effect may be less than these 
simulation suggests. We compare the returns on the two portfolios, ew64 and ew800, noting 
the average dilution effect could be much less for the latter after the mid-eighties, because the 
latter portfolio includes many funds that started after that period and that the dilution effect 
should be less for these funds. We compare the sub-period return of both ew64 and ew800 
funds; where the returns are 8.70% p.a. and 8.41% p.a. for 1981-86, and are -3.50% p.a. and -
3.76% p.a. for 1987-92, respectively. We do not find the ew64 return to be less than the ew800 
return. 
There is a fund selection strategy that allows investors of open-type funds to take 
advantage of this institutional setting. An anecdotal example is that an investor can select a 
fund whose NAV is deep below P, since the probability of future NAV being less than P is 
higher in this case than otherwise. An investor can benefit from two sources if NAV is less 
than P in the future. First, the NAV directly reflects the performance of managers since there 
is no dilution effect. Second, an investor need not pay capital gain tax. On the other hand, if 
an investor buys a share in a fund whose NAV is above P, he or she benefits by paying less 
than the existing NAV; thus diluting the fund value. However, this investor is more likely to 
suffer from future dilution effect and also from paying capital gain tax. Using the same 
simulations as above, we calculate the difference in returns between a strategy of buying a fund 
whose NAV is below P by 10%, and that of buying a fund whose NAV is above P by 10%. 
The result shows that buying funds whose NAV is below P yields on average 0.91% p.a. more 
than buying funds whose NAV is above P .23 
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5. Conclusions and Implications 
In this paper we investigate the performance of the Japanese open-type equity mutual funds. 
We find that over the Jan. 1981-Dec. 1992 period, the value-weighted and equal-weighted 
portfolios of the 800 mutual funds run by the nine management companies underperform the 
single-index benchmark by approximately 7.0% and 6.0%, respectively. The subset of funds 
that invest mainly in domestic equity performed even worse. The poor performance was 
pervasive among the different companies examined, and found in the bull as well as the bear 
markets. 
Our results are robust to the methodology used, as well as the benchmark portfolios used. 
We consider the possibility that managers tilted their portfolios towards large and glamour 
firms relative to the single market index, thus we may get underperformance because of using 
the wrong benchmarks. While we find indeed fund managers tilt towards stocks that have 
larger market capitalization and low BE/ME ratios, or large and glamour stocks, the funds still 
underperform by the same magnitude as before, relative to portfolios that passively follow the 
strategy of buying large and glamour stocks. 
We finally are left with the explanation related to institutional features of the mutual fund 
industry: the excessive turnover, transaction expenses, or the dilution effect from fund inflows 
on the NAV due to the share prices that is based on the after-tax value. That the compensation 
of the fund manager is usually not directly linked to the funds' performances and that, on the 
aggregate, the funds have higher turnover than the market lend some credibility to this. We 
find, based on bootstrap experiments, that the dilution effect may, under a set of assumptions 
that yield the maximum effect, explain 3% p.a. of the underperformance with a probability of 
fifty percent. However, a comparison between the performance of funds that existed from the 
beginning of our sample period and those that started later shows that there is not significant 
difference between their performance, which suggests that the dilution effect may not be 
serious. Without direct data on turnover, fund composition, and fund inflow, the dilution 
explanation is at best a conjecture.24 The results reported in this paper have raised some 
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serious questions concerning the performance of Japanese mutual funds that need to be 
addressed in future research. 
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i The so-called open-type mutual funds are similar to open-end funds in that new principal 
can be added to the fund and that investors can cancel their investments by withdrawing the 
principal. On the other hand, no new principal can be added to the unit-type mutual funds. In 
contrast to the closed-end funds, unit-type funds are not traded and the investors liquidate 
their investments by withdrawing the principal. 
2 As of May 1994, there are 11 trust companies and one commercial bank that are engaged in 
the trust function. 
3 The Ministry of Finance has licensed non-Japanese affiliated companies to operate mutual 
fund companies after October 1990, and has licensed Japanese bank-affiliated companies to do 
the same after October 1993. As of May 1994, the 16 management companies affiliated with 
domestic brokerage houses include Nomura, Nikko, Yamaichi, Daiwa, Taiyo, Shin-Wako, 
Sanyo, Asahi, Japan, Daiichi, Kokusai, Cosmo, Tokyo, Universal, Taiheiyo and Toyo. The 
bank-affiliated management companies include SBIM, Sakura, Sanwa, Nochu and Fuji, and the 
foreign-affiliated management companies are Warburg, Jardine Fleming, Invesco, Schroder and 
Credit Suisse. 
4
 Typically the upper limit of stock investment is 30% for so called convertible bond open type 
funds. 
5
 Source: Flow of Funds Account, The Bank of Japan. 
e 0.715%=l.lx{0.1+(0.1+0.45)}/ 1.320%=l.lx(0.375+(0.375+0.45)}. The securities transfer tax rate 
for equity has been changed as follows: 0.3% until 3/1978, 0.45% for 4/1978-12/1987, 0.55% for 
1/1988-3/1992, 0.3% from 4/1992. Consumption tax (0.3%) is levied on brokerage fees 
effective April 1989. After this date corresponding variable costs are 




 The choice of the sample period is constrained by the facts that various accounting data, 
market capitalization, and stock returns from the PACAP database are only available until the 
end of 1992, and that the value-weighted indices for bonds are not available before 1981. 
8
 Nomura has one fund which undergoes a l-for-3 split. Yamaichi, Taiyo and Asahi each have 
one fund which undergoes a l-for-2 split. Both the net asset value and dividend payment are 
adjusted when calculating the returns. 
9
 The well-diversified Japanese stock funds are selected based on the following criteria: (a) No 
upper limit on stock investment, (b) upper limit on foreign investment and (c) no specialization 
in particular industry or type of stocks such as low capitalization or growth stocks. 
10
 The index is a value-weighted average of the Tokyo Stock Market Index (TOPIX) and Daiwa 
Bond Index from the Daiwa Institute of Research. The aggregate market values of bonds were 
also obtained from Daiwa. As of the end of December 1992, stocks, government and corporate 
bonds, and convertible bonds accounted for 60%, 30%, and 10% of the value of the index 
portfolio, respectively. 
11
 As of end-1993, stock open-type mutual funds had 9.6% of their investment in foreign assets. 
12
 Ferson and Schadt (1994) show that when equation (2) is the true model, equation (1) is 
estimated as: 
In a different context, Chan (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) suggest that the correlation 
between the time-varying beta and risk premium gives rise to a biased estimate of the returns 
earned by the contrarian investment strategy. 
13
 For individual funds, the null hypothesis that the information variables are irrelevant can be 
rejected at the 5% level for 47 out of the 64 funds. 
14
 We reject the null hypothesis that conditional information is irrelevant for the 30 portfolios. 
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15
 We also calculated the PPW measure from the three-factor model. The results are similar to 
those obtained from the single factor model. 
16
 In order to form the passive portfolios, accounting information was obtained from the 
PACAP Japanese tape which has a forward looking bias; i.e., the delisted firms are excluded 
from the data whenever the tape is newly compiled. See Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) 
for similar comments on Japanese data. The observation period for this study is twelve years 
from January 1981 to December 1992 and 53 companies were delisted during the period among 
1,412 companies in 1981 and 1,651 in 1992. Majority of these companies were delisted either 
due to mergers and/or to financial distress. Since the number of delisted companies seems to 
be relatively small, the bias may not be significant for our study. 
17
 From personal conversation with those in the management companies. 
18
 We also considered the timing ability using the Merton-Henriksson(1981) model, which 
models the manager's timing behavior as creating an option-like payoff. Tests involving the 
passive portfolios show spurious timing ability with this model, thus we did not carry out the 
analysis of this model on the mutual fund sample. 
19
 The authors particularly thank Katsuhide Hatanaka and Osamu Shigeta for having drawn 
our attention to this fact. 
20
 Capital loss is not recognized in this tax rule. 
21 Source: The Investment Trusts Association, Tokyo. From personal interviews with some 
management firms, we find that the inflow rate of 0.1 is not an unreasonable number for 
particular months, but it may be too large for the average of the whole period. 
22
 If more funds flow into funds that have higher performance, the dilution effect would be 
emphasized. 
23
 The simulation assumes fund inflow rate of 0.1 per month and a holding period of 10 years. 
This number is from one of the bootstrap experiments that we conducted above. We also 
generated the distributions of the rate of return of the traded price, P, to assess the impact of 
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dilution effect on investors. We find in general that the average return for the investors 
becomes lower as much as the dilution effect. However, the standard deviations of the returns 
of P become smaller than those of the NAV returns. 
24
 Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka (1993) find that funds with higher fees and turnover 
underperform those with lower fees and turnover for the US. 
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